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Abstract
The architecture described in this paper encodes a theory of intentions based on the the key principles of non-
procrastination, persistence, and automatically limiting reasoning to relevant knowledge and observations. The ar-
chitecture reasons with transition diagrams of any given domain at two different resolutions, with the fine-resolution
description defined as a refinement of, and hence tightly-coupled to, a coarse-resolution description. Non-monotonic
logical reasoning with the coarse-resolution description computes an activity (i.e., plan) comprising abstract actions
for any given goal. Each abstract action is implemented as a sequence of concrete actions by automatically zooming
to and reasoning with the part of the fine-resolution transition diagram relevant to the current coarse-resolution tran-
sition and the goal. Each concrete action in this sequence is executed using probabilistic models of the uncertainty
in sensing and actuation, and the corresponding fine-resolution outcomes are used to infer coarse-resolution obser-
vations that are added to the coarse-resolution history. The architecture’s capabilities are evaluated in the context of
a simulated robot assisting humans in an office domain, on a physical robot (Baxter) manipulating tabletop objects,
and on a wheeled robot (Turtlebot) moving objects to particular places or people. The experimental results indicate
improvements in reliability and computational efficiency compared with an architecture that does not include the
theory of intentions, and an architecture that does not include zooming for fine-resolution reasoning.
1 Introduction
Consider a wheeled robot delivering objects to particular places or people, or a robot with manipulators stacking
objects in particular configurations on a tabletop, as shown in Figure 1. Such robots that are deployed to assist humans
in dynamic domains have to reason with different descriptions of uncertainty and incomplete domain knowledge.
Information about the domain often includes commonsense knowledge, especially default knowledge that holds in
all but a few exceptional circumstances. For instance, the robot may be told that “books are usually in the library,
but cookbooks may be in the kitchen”. The robot also extracts information from sensor inputs using algorithms that
quantify uncertainty probabilistically, e.g., “I am 95% certain the robotics book is on the table”. Although it is difficult
to equip robots with comprehensive domain knowledge or provide elaborate supervision, reasoning with incomplete or
incorrect information can lead to incorrect or suboptimal outcomes, especially when the robot is faced with unexpected
success or failure. For example, a robot may be asked to move two books from the office to the library in a domain with
four rooms. If this robot can only grasp one object at a time, it will plan to move one book at a time from the office to
the library. After moving the first book, if the robot observes the second book in the library, or in another room on the
way back to the office, it should stop executing the current plan because this plan will no longer achieve the desired
goal. Instead, it should reason about this unexpected observation and compute a new plan if necessary. One way
to achieve this behavior with a traditional planning system is to reason about all observations of domain objects and
events during plan execution, but this approach is computationally unfeasible in complex domains. The architecture
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described in this paper, on the other hand, achieves the desired behavior by equipping a robot pursuing a particular
goal with an adapted theory of intentions. This theory builds on the fundamental principles of non-procrastination and
persistence in the pursuit of a desired goal. It enables the robot to reason about mental actions and states, automatically
identifying and considering the domain observations relevant to the current action and the goal during planning and
execution. We refer to actions in such plans as intentional actions. We describe the following characteristics of our
architecture:
• The domain’s transition diagrams at two different resolutions are described in an action language, with the fine-
resolution transition diagram defined as a refinement of the coarse-resolution transition diagram. At the coarse
resolution, non-monotonic logical reasoning with commonsense knowledge produces a sequence of intentional
abstract actions for any given goal.
• Each intentional abstract action is implemented as a sequence of concrete actions by automatically zooming to
and reasoning with the part of the fine-resolution system description relevant to the current coarse-resolution
transition and the goal. Each concrete action in this sequence is executed using probabilistic models of uncer-
tainty, and the outcomes are added to the coarse-resolution history.
Action languages are formalisms that are used to model domain dynamics (i.e., action effects). We chose to use
an extension to action language ALd [14], which we introduced in prior work to model non-Boolean fluents and
non-deterministic causal laws [26], because it provides the desired expressive power for robotics domains. Also,
we chose to translate our action language descriptions to programs in CR-Prolog [2], an extension of Answer Set
Prolog (ASP) [13], because it supports non-monotonic logical reasoning with incomplete commonsense knowledge
in dynamic domains, which is a key desired capability in robotics1. Furthermore, for the execution of each concrete
action, we use existing algorithms that include probabilistic models of the uncertainty in perception and actuation.
Our architecture builds on the complementary strengths of prior work on an architecture that used declarative pro-
gramming to reason about intended actions to achieve a given goal [5], and an architecture that introduced step-wise
refinement of tightly-coupled transition diagrams at two different resolutions to support non-monotonic logical rea-
soning and probabilistic reasoning for planning and diagnostics [26]. Prior work on the refinement-based architecture
does not include a theory of intentions. Also, prior work on the theory of intentions does not consider the uncertainty
in sensing and actuation, and does not scale to complex domains. The key contributions of our architecture are thus
to:
• enable planning with intentional abstract actions, and the associated mental states, actions, and beliefs, in the
presence of incomplete domain knowledge, partial observability, and non-deterministic action outcomes; and
• support scalability to larger domains by automatically restricting fine-resolution reasoning to knowledge and
observations relevant to the goal or the coarse-resolution abstract action at hand, and by using probabilistic
models of the uncertainty in sensing and actuation only when executing concrete actions.
We demonstrate the applicability of our architecture in the context of a: (i) simulated robot assisting humans in an office
domain; (ii) physical robot (Baxter) manipulating objects on a tabletop; and (iii) wheeled robot (Turtlebot) moving
target objects to desired locations or people in an office domain. We show that our architecture improves reliability
and computational efficiency in comparison with a baseline architecture that does not reason about intentional actions
and beliefs at different resolutions, and with a baseline architecture that does not limit reasoning to the relevant part of
the domain.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, Section 2 reviews some related work to motivate the need
for our architecture. Section 3 then describes the knowledge representation and reasoning architecture. The results of
evaluating the capabilities of this architecture are described in Section 4, followed by a description of the conclusions
and future work in Section 5.
1We use the terms “ASP” and “CR-Prolog” interchangeably in this paper. In the logic programming literature, ASP is also referred to as “Answer
Set Programming” but we chose to use the earlier “Answer Set Prolog” expansion because we often refer to ASP programs.
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Figure 1: Robot platforms used in the experimental trials reported in this paper: (a) Baxter robot manipulating objects
on a tabletop; and (b) Turtlebot moving objects to particular locations in a lab.
2 Related Work
There is much work on modeling, recognizing, and reasoning about intentions. For instance, Belief-desire-intention
(BDI) architectures model the intentions of reasoning agents and use these models to eliminate choices that are in-
consistent with the agent’s current intentions [6, 20]. However, these approaches do not learn from experience, are
unable to adapt to new situations, and make it difficult (by themselves) to explicitly represent or reason about goals
(e.g., for planning). There has been work in developing probabilistic graphical models that enable a robot to reason
with encoded domain knowledge and learned models to recognize a human participant’s intentions [16, 17]. These
approaches assume that the structure of the models used to represent knowledge is known a priori (e.g., the nodes and
links of a hidden Markov model), and use prior (observed) data to estimate the model parameters, e.g., the probabilities
of particular state transitions, and of obtaining particular observations. Reasoning about intent, and identifying dis-
crepancies between expectations and observations, has also been modeled as a component of architectures for agents
that perform goal-directed reasoning. For instance, a recent architecture models metacognitive expectations by allow-
ing agents to reason about their cognition [7]. This meta-reasoning is achieved by introducing different levels in the
architecture, along with distinct mechanisms at each level, to represent and reason about the domain knowledge and
the beliefs of the associated agent. Having such separate levels that are not tightly coupled limits generalization, and
the smooth transfer of control and information between the levels.
Initial work on formalizing intentions based on declarative programming introduced an action language and two
fundamental principles: (i) non-procrastination, i.e., intended actions are executed as soon as possible; and (ii) persis-
tence, i.e., unfulfilled intentions persist [3]. This architecture did not model agents with specific goals, but it was used
to enable an observer to recognize an agent’s activity and intention [12]. The Theory of Intentions (T I) extended this
work to goal-driven agents by expanding transition diagrams with physical states and physically executable actions
to include mental fluents and actions [4, 5]. It associated a sequence of agent actions (called an “activity”) with the
goal it intended to achieve, and the intentional agent only performed activities needed to achieve the goal. This the-
ory has been used to understand narratives of restaurant scenarios [30], and to model goal-driven agents in dynamic
domains [23]. A requirement of such theories is that the domain knowledge, including the preconditions and effects
of actions and goals, be encoded in advance, which is difficult to do in robot domains. Also, the set of states (and ac-
tions) can be large in robot domains, making efficient reasoning a challenging task. Recent work attempted to improve
computational efficiency of reasoning with such theories by clustering indistinguishable states [24], but this approach
required the clusters to be encoded in advance [30]. Furthermore, these approaches do not consider the uncertainty in
sensing and actuation, which is the primary source of error in robotics.
Logic-based methods have been used widely in robotics, including those that also support probabilistic reason-
ing [15, 31]. Methods based on classical first-order logic do not support non-monotonic logical reasoning or the
desired expressiveness, e.g., it is not always meaningful to express degrees of belief by attaching probabilities to logic
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Figure 2: Architecture represents intentions and beliefs as tightly coupled transition diagrams at two different resolu-
tions. It combines the complementary strengths of declarative programming and probabilistic reasoning, and may be
viewed as interactions between a controller, logician, and executor.
statements. Logics such as ASP support non-monotonic logical reasoning and have been used in cognitive robotics [10]
and many other applications [9]. However, classical ASP formulations do not support probabilistic models of uncer-
tainty, and such models are used widely to model the uncertainty in sensing and actuation in robotics. Approaches
based on logic programming also do not support one or more of the desired capabilities such as reasoning with large
probabilistic components, or incremental addition of probabilistic information and variables to reason about open
worlds. As a step towards addressing these challenges, our prior refinement-based architecture reasoned with tightly-
coupled transition diagrams at two resolutions [26]. For any given goal, each abstract action in a coarse-resolution plan
computed using ASP-based reasoning with commonsense knowledge, was executed as a sequence of concrete actions
computed by probabilistic reasoning over the relevant part of the fine-resolution diagram using partially observable
Markov decision processes. In this paper, we explore the combination of the principles of step-wise refinement with
those of T I. In comparison with prior work, the architecture described in this paper supports reasoning about inten-
tional actions and beliefs in the presence of incomplete domain knowledge, partial observability, and non-deterministic
action outcomes, and it incorporates a more efficient approach for fine-resolution reasoning to support scalability to
larger domains.
3 Knowledge Representation and Reasoning Architecture
Figure 2 is a simplified block diagram of the overall architecture. Similar to prior work [26], this architecture may
be viewed as comprising three tightly-coupled components: a controller, a logician, and an executor; the significant
differences in comparison with prior work are described later in this section. The controller maintains the overall
beliefs regarding the state of the domain, and transfers control and information between the components. Reasoning is
based on transition diagrams of the domain at two different resolutions, with a fine-resolution representation defined
as a refinement of a coarse-resolution representation of the domain. For any given goal, the logician performs non-
monotonic logical reasoning with the coarse-resolution representation of commonsense domain knowledge to generate
an activity, i.e., a sequence of intentional abstract actions to achieve the goal. To implement each such intentional
abstract action, the controller automatically zooms to the part of the fine-resolution representation that is relevant to
the desired abstract transition and the goal. Reasoning with this relevant part provides a plan of concrete actions; each
such concrete action is executed by the executor using probabilistic models of the uncertainty in sensing and actuation.
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The observed and inferred outcomes of executing a concrete action, along with any other relevant observations, are
communicated to the controller and added to the coarse-resolution history. The logician reasons with this history and
continues with the current activity of intentional abstract actions only if it will achieve the desired goal. If, on the
other hand, the logician finds that pursuing the current activity will not achieve the desired goal, a new activity is
computed and implemented. We use CR-Prolog to represent and reason with the coarse-resolution and fine-resolution
representations. We use existing implementations of probabilistic algorithms for executing concrete actions. The
following running example will be used to describe the components of the architecture, along with differences from
prior work.
Example 1 [Robot Assistant (RA) Domain] Consider a robot assisting humans in moving particular objects to desired
locations in an indoor office domain with:
• Sorts such as place, thing, robot, object, and book, arranged hierarchically, e.g., object and robot are subsorts
of thing. Sort names and constants are in lower-case, and variable names are in uppercase.
• Places: {office1, office2, kitchen, library} with a door between neighboring places—see Figure 3; only the
door between kitchen and library can be locked.
• Instances of sorts, e.g., rob1, book1, book2.
• Static attributes such as color, size and different parts (e.g., base and handle) associated with objects.
• Other agents that may influence the domain, e.g., move a book or lock a door. These agents are not modeled
explicitly; only the potential execution of exogenous actions by these agents is used to explain unexpected
observations.
Office 2Office 1 Kitchen Library
Figure 3: Four rooms considered in Example 1, with a human in the kitchen and two books in office2. Only the
library’s door can be locked; all other rooms are open at all times.
3.1 Action Language and Domain Representation
We first describe the action language encoding of the dynamics of the domain, and the translation of this encoding to
CR-Prolog programs for knowledge representation and reasoning.
3.1.1 Action Language ALd
Action languages are formal models of parts of natural language used for describing transition diagrams of dynamic
systems. We use an extension of the action languageALd [14] that supports non-Boolean fluents and non-deterministic
causal laws [26], to describe the transition diagrams of our domain at different resolutions. ALd has a sorted signature
with actions, i.e., a set of elementary operations, statics, i.e., domain attributes whose values cannot be changed by
actions, and fluents, i.e., attributes whose values can be changed by actions. Basic fluents obey laws of inertia and can
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be changed by actions, whereas defined fluents do not obey laws of inertia and are not changed directly by actions.
ALd allows three types of statements (i) causal law; (ii) state constraint; and (iii) executability condition:
a causes lb if p0, . . . , pm (Causal law)
l if p0, . . . , pm (State constraint)
impossible a0, . . . , ak if p0, . . . , pm (Executability condition)
where a is an action, l is a literal (i.e., a domain attribute or its negation), lb is a basic literal, and p0, . . . , pm are domain
literals. The causal law implies that if action a is executed in a state satisfying p0, . . . , pm, the literal lb will be true in
the resulting state. The state constraint implies that literal l is true in a state satisfying p0, . . . , pm. The executability
condition implies that it is impossible to execute actions a0, . . . , ak in a state satisfying domain literals p0, . . . , pm2.
For more details about the syntax and semantics of ALd, please see [14], and for details about the extension of ALd
used in this paper, please see [26].
3.1.2 Coarse-Resolution Knowledge Representation
The coarse-resolution domain representation consists of system description Dc, which is a collection of statements
of ALd, and history Hc. System description Dc has a sorted signature Σc and axioms that describe the correspond-
ing transition diagram τc. The signature Σc defines the basic sorts, domain attributes and actions. In addition to
the basic sorts and ground instances introduced in Example 1, Σc for the RA domain includes sort step for tem-
poral reasoning. Domain attributes (i.e., statics and fluents) and actions are described in terms of their arguments’
sorts. In the RA domain, coarse-resolution statics include relations such as next to(place, place), which describes
the relative arrangement of places in the domain; and relations modeling object attributes, e.g., we may represent
an object’s color as obj color(object, color)3. Fluents of the coarse-resolution representation of the RA domain in-
clude loc(thing, place), which denotes the location of the robot or other domain objects; in hand(robot, object),
which denotes whether a particular object is in the robot’s hand; and locked(place), which implies that a particu-
lar place is locked. The locations of other agents, if any, are not changed by the robot’s actions; these locations
are inferred from observations obtained from other sensors. Next, Σc for the RA domain includes actions such as
move(robot, place), pickup(robot, object), putdown(robot, object), and unlock(robot, place); we also consider
exogenous actions exo move(object, place) and exo lock(place) for diagnostic reasoning, e.g., for explaining unex-
pected observations. Finally, Σc also includes the relation holds(fluent, step) to imply that a particular fluent is true
at a particular time step. Note that it is possible to consider domain attributes and actions as functions and use the corre-
sponding notation, e.g., loc : thing → place, in hand : robot×object→ bool, andmove : robot×place→ action.
We use the predicate notation for simplicity, ease of understanding, and to be consistent with the notation used in other
parts of this paper.
Axioms in the coarse-resolution representation of the RA domain include causal laws, state constraints, and exe-
cutability conditions such as:
move(rob1, P ) causes loc(rob1, P ) (1a)
pickup(rob1, O) causes in hand(rob1, O) (1b)
¬loc(Th, P2) if loc(Th, P1), P1 6= P2 (1c)
loc(O,P ) if loc(rob1, P ), in hand(rob1, O) (1d)
impossible pickup(rob1, O) if loc(rob1, P1), loc(O,P2), P1 6= P2 (1e)
impossible move(rob1, P ) if loc(rob1, P1), ¬next to(P, P1) (1f)
which describe the dynamics of the domain. For instance, Statement 1(a) implies that executing actionmove(rob1, library)
causes loc(rob1, library) to be true in the resultant state, Statement 1(c) implies that any object can only be in one
2For simplicity, we do not describe the non-deterministic causal laws or non-Boolean fluents here.
3It is possible to represent and reason about actions that change the values of the object attributes such as color; we just choose to represent them
as statics in this work.
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location at a time, and Statement 1(e) implies that the robot cannot pick an object up unless the object is in the same lo-
cation as the robot. These axioms are used for inference, planning, and diagnostics, as described later in Section 3.1.3.
The historyHc of a dynamic domain is usually a record of statements of the form: (i) obs(fluent, boolean, step)
implying that particular fluents were observed to be true or false at a particular time step; and (ii) hpd(action, step)
implying that particular actions happened at a particular time step. In [26], this notion was expanded to represent
defaults describing the values of fluents in the initial state. For instance, in the coarse-resolution historyHc of the RA
domain, the statement “a book is usually in the library and if it is not there, it is normally in the office” is encoded as:
initial default loc(X, library) if book(X) (2a)
initial default loc(X, office1) if book(X), ¬loc(X, library) (2b)
These statements represent prioritized defaults. We can also encode exceptions, e.g., “cookbooks are in the kitchen”;
for more information, please see [13]. Notice that this representation does not assign numerical values to degrees of
belief associated with these defaults, but supports elegant reasoning with generic defaults and their specific exceptions
(if any).
3.1.3 Reasoning with Knowledge
Key tasks of an agent equipped with a system description and history include reasoning with this domain representation
for planning and diagnostics. In our architecture, these tasks are accomplished by translating the domain representation
to a program in CR-Prolog, a variant of ASP that incorporates consistency restoring (CR) rules [2]. An independent
group of researchers have developed (and will be releasing) software to automate the translation between a description
in ALd and the corresponding description in CR-Prolog. In our case, we build on previous work that specified steps
for this translation [26], and either perform this translation manually or use a script that automates this translation.
ASP is based on stable model semantics and supports concepts such as default negation and epistemic disjunction,
e.g., unlike “¬a” that states a is believed to be false, “not a” only implies a is not believed to be true, and unlike
“p ∨ ¬p” in propositional logic, “p or ¬p” is not tautologous. In other words, each literal can be true, false or
just “unknown”, and an agent associated with an ASP program only believes that which it is forced to believe. ASP
can also represent recursive definitions and constructs that are difficult to express in classical logic formalisms, and it
supports non-monotonic logical reasoning, i.e., it is able to revise previously held conclusions based on new evidence.
The CR-Prolog program Π(Dc,Hc) for the coarse-resolution representation of the RA domain includes the signature
and axioms of Dc, inertia axioms, reality checks, closed world assumptions (CWAs) for defined fluents and actions.
For instance, Π(Dc,Hc) includes:
holds(F, I + 1)← holds(F, I), not ¬holds(F, I + 1) (3a)
¬holds(F, I + 1)← ¬holds(F, I), not holds(F, I + 1) (3b)
← ¬holds(F, I), obs(F, true, I) (3c)
← holds(F, I), obs(F, false, I) (3d)
¬occurs(A, I)← not occurs(A, I) (3e)
where Statements 3(a)-(b) are inertia axioms for basic fluents, Statements 3(c)-(d) are reality check axioms implying
that any mismatch between observations and expectations based on current beliefs results in an inconsistency, and
Statement 3(e) is the CWA for actions.
Program Π(Dc,Hc) also includes observations, actions, and defaults from Hc. Every default also has a CR rule
that allows the robot to assume the default’s conclusion is false to restore consistency under exceptional circumstances.
For instance, the axiom:
¬loc(X, library) +← book(X) (4)
considers the rare event of a book not being in the library. This axiom is only used under exceptional circumstances
to restore consistency in the presence of an unexpected observation, e.g., a book that is expected to be in the library
is later found to be in office2. Each answer set of an ASP program, typically computed by applying a SAT (i.e.,
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satisfiability) solver to the ASP program, represents the set of beliefs of an agent associated with the program. Al-
gorithms for computing entailment, and for planning and diagnostics, reduce these tasks to computing answer sets
of CR-Prolog programs. We compute answer sets of CR-Prolog programs using the system called SPARC [1]. An
illustrative version of the coarse-resolution CR-Prolog program for the RA domain (written using SPARC) is available
in our open-source software repository [25].
3.2 Adapted Theory of Intention
For any given goal, a robot reasoning with domain knowledge (as described above) will compute a plan and execute
it actions in the plan until either the goal is achieved or an action in the plan has an unexpected outcome. In the latter
case, the robot will attempt to explain the unexpected outcome (i.e., perform diagnostics) and compute a new plan if
necessary. To motivate the need for a different approach in dynamic domains, consider the following five scenarios in
which the goal is to move book1 and book2 to the library; these scenarios have been adapted from scenarios considered
in prior work [5]:
• Scenario 1 (planning): Robot rob1 is in the kitchen holding book1, and believes book2 is in the kitchen and
that the library is unlocked. The computed plan is:
move(rob1, library), putdown(rob1, book1)
move(rob1, kitchen), pickup(rob1, book2)
move(rob1, library), putdown(rob1, book2)
• Scenario 2 (unexpected success): Assume that rob1 in Scenario-1 has moved to the library and put book1
down, and observes book2 there. The robot should be able to explain this observation (e.g., book2 was moved
there as a result of an exogenous action) and realize that the goal has been achieved.
• Scenario 3 (not expected to achieve goal, diagnose and replan, case 1): Assume rob1 in Scenario-1 starts
moving book1 to library, but observes book2 is not in the kitchen. The robot should realize the plan will fail
to achieve the overall goal, explain the unexpected observation, and compute a new plan.
• Scenario 4 (not expected to achieve goal, diagnose and replan, case 2): Assume rob1 is in the kitchen holding
book1, and believes that book2 is in office2 and the library is unlocked. The robot plans to put book1 in the
library before fetching book2 from office2. Before rob1 moves to the library, it unexpectedly observes book2
in the kitchen. The robot should realize that its current plan will fail, explain the unexpected observation, and
compute a new plan.
• Scenario 5 (failure to achieve the goal, diagnose and replan): Assume robot rob1 in Scenario-1 is putting
book2 in the library, after having put book1 in the library earlier, and observes that book1 is no longer there.
The robot’s intention should persist; it should explain the unexpected observation, replan if necessary, and
execute actions until the goal is achieved (i.e., both books are in the library).
One way to support the desired behavior in such scenarios is to reason with all observations of domain objects and
events, e.g., observations of all objects in the field of view of the robot’s (or the domain’s) sensors, during plan exe-
cution. Such an approach would be computationally unfeasible in complex domains in which there may be many new
observations and events at each time step. Also, only a small number of these observations and events may be relevant
to the task at hand. We thus pursue a different approach in our architecture; our adapted theory of intention builds on
the principles of non-procrastination and persistence, and extends the ideas from T I. Specifically, our architecture
enables the robot to automatically compute actions that are intended for the given goal and current beliefs. As the
robot attempts to implement each such action, the robot automatically identifies and considers those observations that
are “relevant” to this action or the goal. The robot adds these observations to the recorded history, and uses them to
reason about mental states and actions, to determine if and when it should replan as against following the existing plan.
We will henceforth use AT I to refer to this adapted theory of intention; it expands both the system description Dc
and historyHc in the original program Π(Dc,Hc) to reason about intentional actions and beliefs. Below, we describe
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the steps of this expansion along with some examples, and provide a link to an illustrative program that is obtained by
applying these steps in the RA domain.
First, the signature Σc is expanded to represent an activity as a triplet comprising a goal, a plan to achieve the goal,
and a specific name for the activity. We do so by introducing (in Σc) relations such as:
activity(name), activity goal(name, goal) (5)
activity length(name, length)
activity component(name, number, action)
which represent each named activity, the goal and length of each activity, and the actions that are the components of
the activity. Note that these relations are not ground initially because the specific activities and goals are constructed
or defined as needed. However, once they are ground, the corresponding terms behave as statics.
Next, the existing fluents of Σc are considered to be physical fluents and the set of fluents is expanded to include
mental fluents such as:
active activity(activity), in progress goal(goal) (6)
next action(activity, action),
in progress activity(activity),
active goal(goal), next activity name(name)
current action index(activity, index)
where the relations in the first three lines are defined fluents, whereas the other relations are basic fluents that obey the
laws of inertia. All these fluents represent the robot’s belief about a particular activity, action, or goal being active or
in progress. None of these mental fluents’ values are changed directly by executing any physical action. For example,
the value of the relation current action index changes if the robot has completed an intended action or if a change in
the domain makes it impossible for an activity to succeed. The values of the other mental fluents are changed directly
or indirectly by expanding the set of existing physical actions of Σc to include mental actions such as:
start(name), stop(name) (7)
select(goal), abandon(goal)
where the first two mental actions are used by the controller to start or stop a particular activity, and the other two
actions represent exogenous actions executed (e.g., by a human or an external system) to select or abandon a goal.
In addition to Σc, the domain’s historyHc is expanded to include relations such as:
attempt(action, step) (8)
¬ hpd(action, step)
which denote that a particular action was attempted at a particular time step, and that a particular action did not happen
(i.e., was not executed successfully) at a particular time step. Note that it is straightforward for the robot to figure
out when an action was attempted, but figuring out when an action was actually executed (or not executed) requires
external (e.g., sensor) input and reasoning, e.g., diagnostic reasoning with observations to determine whether an action
had the intended outcome(s). In our control loop and experimental trials, we use ASP to reason with the observations
to determine whether an action was actually executed, and then use this information for subsequent reasoning.
The expansion of the signature and the history makes it necessary to expand the description of the domain dynam-
ics. To do so, we introduce new axioms in D′c. This includes axioms that represent the effects of the physical and
mental actions on the physical and mental fluents, e.g., starting (stopping) an activity makes it active (inactive), and
executing an action in an activity keeps the current activity active. The new axioms include state constraints, e.g., to
describe conditions under which any particular activity or goal is active, and executability conditions, e.g., it is not
possible for the robot to simultaneously execute two mental actions or to start an activity when another activity is
active and still valid. In addition, axioms are introduced to generate intentional actions, build a consistent model of the
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domain history, and to perform diagnostics. For example, the following axioms are related to finding the next intended
action given an activity and a goal:
occurs(AA, I1) ← current step(I), I <= I1, #agent action(AA), (9a)
active goal activity(AN, I), holds(in progress activity(AN), I1),
holds(next action(AN,AA), I1), not impossible(AA, I1)
projected success(AN, I) ← current step(I), I < I1, holds(G, I1) (9b)
holds(active activity(AN), I1), activity goal(AN,G)
¬projected success(AN, I) ← current step(I), (9c)
not projected success(AN, I)
intended action(AA, I) ← current step(I), #agent action(AA), (9d)
active goal activity(AN, I), holds(next action(AN,AA), I),
projected success(AN, I)
where Statement 9(a) implies that if the next agent action AA in the current activity is not impossible, it is expected
to occur in a subsequent time step. Statement 9(b) implies that if the goal holds in a future step, given that actions of
the current activity AN occur as planned, the activity has a projected success. Statement 9(c) implies that if we do not
have a projected success, it must have been because one of our actions cannot occur, or our current activity AN does
not reach the goal. Finally, Statement 9(d) implies that if our current activity has a projected success, the activity’s
next action will be the next intended action.
As another example, the following axioms of D′c define an activity as being futile:
← current step(I), active goal activity(AN, I), (10a)
¬ projected success(AN, I), not futile activity(AN, I)
futile activity(AN, I)
+← current step(I), active goal activity(AN, I), (10b)
¬ projected success(AN, I)
intended action(stop(AN), I) ← currentstep(I), active goal activity(AN, I),
futile activity(AN, I) (10c)
where Statement 10(a) introduces an inconsistency if there is an active activity AN that does not have projected
success and has not been defined as being futile. Then, Statement 10(b) is a CR rule that provides a path out of such
an inconsistency by defining the activity as being futile in these exceptional circumstances. Finally, Statement 10(c)
implies that is an activity as been defined as being futile, the next intentional action of the robot will be to stop this
activity and plan a different activity.
As described in Section 3.1.3, we use a script to automatically translate the revised system description D′c and
history H′c to a CR-Prolog program Π(D′c,H′c) that is solved for planning or diagnostics. However, recall that CR-
rules are used to build a consistent model of history, which involves reasoning about potential exceptions to defaults
and the execution of exogenous actions, and to generate minimal plans of intentional actions. This reasoning is
challenging because we need to encode some preferences between the different CR rules; unexpected observations
could potentially be explained using exceptions to defaults or using exogenous actions, e.g., a book may be observed
in the kitchen because it is an exception to the corresponding default, or because it was moved there by some one.
Our preference is based on the following key postulate: assumption:
Unexpected observations are more likely to be due to exceptions to defaults than due to exogenous actions.
This is a reasonable claims for many robotics domains, and is translated to the following preference:
First try to explain unexpected observations by considering exceptions to defaults; if that does not suffice, consider
exogenous actions to generate explanations.
Even with this preference, the agent will have to use CR rules for both diagnostics and planning. Exploring all
possible combinations of such rules can become computationally expensive in complex domains. To ensure efficient
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and correct reasoning while still encoding the desired preference, we modify the axioms (by adding suitable flags) such
that coarse-resolution reasoning withAT I is performed in two phases. The robot first computes a consistent model of
history without considering axioms for plan generation, and then uses this model to guide the computation of plan(s)
without considering the axioms for diagnostics. A CR-Prolog program illustrating this process for the RA domain,
written in SPARC with explanatory comments, is available in ToI planning.sp in the folder simulation/ASP files/
in our open-source software repository [25].
The following are the key differences that distinguish AT I from the prior work on T I and the prior work on coarse-
resolution reasoning in the refinement-based architecture [26]::
1. T I becomes computationally expensive, especially as the size of the plan or domain history increases. Reason-
ing with T I performs diagnostics and planning jointly, which allows it to consider different explanations during
planning but makes computation unfeasible in all but the very simple domains. On the other hand, reasoning
with AT I, as stated above, first builds a consistent model of history by considering different explanations,
and uses the chosen model to guide planning, significantly improving computational efficiency and supporting
scalability in complex domains.
2. T I assumes complete knowledge of the state of other agents (e.g., humans or other robots) that perform ex-
ogenous actions. In most robotics domains, this assumption is unrealistic; these domains typically only afford
partial observability. AT I instead makes the more realistic assumption that the robot can only make unreliable
observations of its domain through its sensors and infer exogenous actions by reasoning about and trying to
explain these observations.
3. AT I does not include the notion of sub-goals and sub-activities (and associated relations) from T I, as they
are not necessary. Also, these sub-activities and sub-goals need to be encoded in advance to use T I, which
is difficult to do in practical (robotics) domains. Furthermore, even if this knowledge is encoded, it will make
reasoning (e.g., for planning or diagnostics) significantly more computationally expensive if the robot has to
repeatedly examine if one of the many stored activities provides a minimal and correct path to the desired goal.
4. Coarse-resolution reasoning in the prior work on the refinement-based architecture did not (a) reason about
intentional actions; or (b) reason about exogenous actions in addition to initial state defaults. These limitations
are relaxed in the architecture described in this paper. A consistent model of history is constructed with defaults
and exogenous actions at the coarse resolution, and reasoning with intentional actions supports reasoning in the
presence of unexpected successes and failures.
Any architecture with AT I, the original T I, or a different reasoning component based on non-monotonic logics or
classical first-order logic, will have two key limitations that have not been discussed so far. First, reasoning does not
scale well to the finer resolution at which actions will often have to be executed to perform various tasks in robotics
domains. For instance, the coarse-resolution representation discussed so far is not sufficient if the robot has to grasp and
pickup a particular cup from a particular table, or deliver the cup to a particular person. Also, using logics to reason
with a sufficiently fine-grained domain representation (e.g., to perform the grasping task) will be computationally
expensive. Second, we have not yet modeled the actual sensor observations of the robot or the uncertainty in sensing
and actuation. This uncertainty is the primary source of error on robots, and many existing algorithms use probabilities
to model this uncertainty quantitatively. Section 2 discusses additional limitations of approaches based on logical and
probabilistic reasoning for robotics domains. Our architecture addresses these limitations by combining AT I with
ideas that build on prior work on a refinement-based architecture [26], as described below.
3.3 Refinement, Zooming and Execution
Consider a coarse-resolution system description Dc of transition diagram τc that includes AT I. For any given goal,
reasoning with Π(Dc,Hc) will provide an activity, i.e., a sequence of abstract intentional actions. In our architecture,
the execution of the coarse-resolution transition corresponding to each such abstract action is based on a fine-resolution
system description Df of transition diagram τf that is a refinement of, and is tightly coupled to, Dc. We can imagine
refinement as taking a closer look at the domain through a magnifying lens, potentially leading to the discovery
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of concrete structures that were previously abstracted away by the designer, e.g., for efficient reasoning with rich
commonsense knowledge. Our architecture builds on the general design methodology described in prior work [26]
to construct Df using Dc and some domain-specific information provided by the designer. This approach includes
a weak refinement that temporarily limits the robot’s ability to observe the value of fluents (through sensors), and a
theory of observation that leads to the definition of strong refinement by relaxing this limitation. The coarse-resolution
transition is then implemented by automatically zooming to and reasoning with the part ofDf relevant to this transition
and the coarse-resolution goal. We describe the steps of this process and highlight key differences between our current
approach and prior work [26].
First, the signature Σf of Df includes all elements of Σc except those related to AT I, and a new sort for every
sort of Σc that is magnified by the increase in resolution; these new sorts are the fine-resolution counterparts of the
magnified sorts. For instance, Σf of the RA domain includes:
place = {office1, office2, kitchen, library}, cup = {cup1}, (11)
place∗ = {c1, . . . , cm}, cup∗ = {cup1 base, cup1 handle}
book = {book1, book2}
where the superscript “*” represents fine-resolution counterparts of the sorts in Dc that are magnified by refinement.
Also, {c1, . . . , cm} are the grid cells that are the components of the original set of places, and any cup has a base
and handle as components (i.e., parts); a book, on the other hand, is not magnified and has no components. The sort
hierarchy is also suitably modified, e.g., cup and cup∗ are siblings that are children of sort object. Also, for each
domain attribute of Σc magnified by the increase in resolution, we introduce appropriate fine-resolution counterparts
in Σf . For instance, in the RA domain, Σf includes domain attributes such as:
loc(thing, place), next to(place, place) (12)
loc∗(thing∗, place∗), next to∗(place∗, place∗)
where relations with and without the “*” superscript represent the fine-resolution counterparts and their coarse-
resolution versions respectively. The specific relations listed above describe the location of each thing at two different
resolutions, and describe two places or cells that are next to each other. The signature Σf will also include actions that
are copies of those in Σc and those with magnified sorts. For instance, Σf for the RA domain includes:
move(robot, place), in hand(robot, object) (13)
move∗(robot, place∗), in hand∗(robot, cup∗)
Finally, the signature Σf includes domain-dependent statics component(O∗, O) relating the magnified objects and
their counterparts, e.g., component(cup1 base, cup1) describes that the base of a cup is a component of the corre-
sponding cup. The axioms of Df are then obtained by restricting the axioms of Dc (except those for AT I) to the
signature Σf . This would, for instance, remove all axioms related toAT I, leave certain axioms unchanged, and intro-
duce fine-resolution versions of certain axioms. For instance, the axioms in Df for the RA domain will now include:
move∗(R,C) causes loc∗(R,C) (14a)
pickup(R,O) causes in hand(R,O) (14b)
pickup∗(R,Opart) causes in hand∗(R,Opart) (14c)
next to∗(C2, C1) if next to∗(C1, C2) (14d)
where C, C1 and C2 are elements of sort place∗ (i.e., grid cells in places), and Opart is an element of sort cup∗,
i.e., cup1 base or cup1 handle. We also include bridge axioms that relate coarse-resolution domain attributes to their
fine-resolution counterparts. For instance:
loc(O,P ) if component(C,P ), loc∗(O,C) (15a)
in hand(R,O) if component(Opart,O), in hand∗(R,Opart) (15b)
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where Statement 15(a) implies that any object that is in a particular cell within a particular room is also within that
room, and Statement 15(b) implies that if the robot has some part of an object in its grasp then the entire object is also
in its grasp. Note that the refinement process does not inherit any of the relations or axioms that were introduced in
Dc to reason about intentional actions.
Next, to support the observation of the values of fluents, the signature Σf is expanded to include knowledge-
producing action test(robot, f luent) that checks the value of a fluent in a given state, and only changes the value of
appropriate (fine-resolution) knowledge fluents. We also introduce knowledge fluents to describe observations of the
environment, e.g., basic fluents to describe the direct (sensor-based) observation of the values of the fine-resolution
fluents, and defined domain-dependent fluents that determine when the value of a particular fluent can be tested. Note
that the value of any concrete fluent or static in Σf is directly observable, e.g., the grid cell location of the robot,
whereas any abstract fluent or static in Σf is only indirectly observable, e.g., the place location of an object cannot
be observed directly. The axioms of Df are then expanded to include (a) causal laws describing the effect of the test
action on the corresponding fine-resolution basic knowledge fluents; (b) executability conditions for these test actions;
(c) axioms that describe the robot’s ability to sense the values of directly and indirectly observable fluents; and (d)
auxiliary axioms for indirect observation of fluents. For example:
test(rob1, F ) causes observed(rob1, F ) if F = true (16a)
impossible test(rob1, F ) if ¬can test(rob1, F ) (16b)
can test(rob1, in hand(rob1, O)) (16c)
observed(rob1, loc(O,P )) if observed(rob1, loc(O,C)), component(C,P ) (16d)
where can test(rob1, F ) is a domain-dependent defined fluent that encodes the information about when the robot
can test the value of a particular fluent, and observed(rob1, F ) is a knowledge fluent that encodes that the robot has
observed a particular value for a particular fluent directly, e.g., Statement 16(a), or indirectly, e.g., Statement 16(d).
Prior work has shown that if certain conditions are met by the definition of Df and Dc, then for each transition in
τc between coarse-resolution states σ1 and σ2, there exists a path in τf between some refinement of σ1 and some
refinement of σ2—see [26] for related definitions and proofs. Although the Dc described in this paper also includes
AT I, recall that the design of our architecture includes the key decision of confining the representation and reasoning
methods associated with this theory to the coarse resolution. In other words, although the transition diagrams for Dc
and Df , i.e., τc and τf , are tightly-coupled, the components of the signature and the axioms added to Dc for AT I are
not refined or included in Df . Our design choice thus enables us to include the additional theory while ensuring that
the result from [26] about the correspondence of paths in τc and τf holds for the coarse and fine resolution descriptions
in this paper.
While the tight coupling established by refinement between the coarse resolution and fine resolution descriptions
is appealing, reasoning at fine resolution using Df becomes computationally unfeasible for complex domains. Also,
the refined description does not (so far) consider probabilistic models of the uncertainty in sensing and actuation. We
address the computational complexity problem through a key expansion to the principle of zooming introduced in [26].
Specifically, for each abstract transition T to be implemented (i.e., executed) at fine resolution, the previous definition
of zooming determined Df (T ), the part of the system description Df relevant to transition T ; it did so by determining
the object constants of Σf relevant to T and restricting Df to these object constants. Here, we extend this definition
of zooming to identify Df (T,G), the part of system description Df relevant to the transition or the overall goal. To
identify this part, we first make some key changes to the definition of relevance in [26] as follows.
Definition 1 [Constants relevant to a transition or goal]
For any given (ground) transition T = 〈σ1, aH , σ2〉 of τc and goal G, relConc(T,G) denotes the minimal set of
object constants of signature Σc of system description Dc closed under the following rules:
1. Object constants occurring in aH are in relConc(T,G);
2. Object constants occurring in G are in relConc(T,G);
3. If the term f(x1, . . . , xn, y) belongs to state σ1 or σ2, but not both, then the constants x1, . . . , xn, y are in
relConc(T,G);
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4. If the body of an executability condition of aH contains a term f(x1, . . . , xn, y) that is in σ1, the constants
x1, . . . , xn, y are in relConc(T,G);
5. If f(x1, . . . , xn, y) belongs to G, then x1, . . . , xn, y are in relObConc(T,G).
Constants from relConc(T,G) are said to be relevant to T or G.
Note that unlike prior work, this definition of relevance considers the coarse-resolution goal when identifying the
object constants relevant to a particular coarse-resolution transition. Consider a scenario in our RA domain, in which
the goal is to take the book tb1, which is known to be in office1, to the library, with the robot rob1 being in the
kitchen. For the first transition T = 〈σ1,move(rob1, office1), σ2〉 in the activity for this goal, rob1 and tb1 are
relevant; other domain objects are not considered to be relevant. Also note that in the absence of considering object
constants relevant to the goal, tb1 would not be in relConc(T,G). Now, the coarse-resolution system description
Dc(T,G) relevant to T or G is obtained by first constructing signature Σc(T,G) whose object constants are those of
relConc(T,G). Basic sorts of Σc(T,G) are intersections of basic sorts of Σc with those of relConc(T,G), e.g., we
would not consider sorts such as cup. The domain attributes and actions of Σc(T,G) are those of Σc restricted to the
basic sorts of Σc(T,G), i.e., we only retain the domain attributes and actions that can be defined entirely in terms of the
basic sorts of Σc(T,G); we would not, for instance, consider in hand(robot, cup) or pickup(robot, cup). In a similar
manner, the axioms of Dc(T,G) are restrictions of axioms of Dc to Σc(T,G), e.g., we would not consider axioms
related to action pickup(robot, cup). It is easy to show that for any coarse-resolution transition T = 〈σ1, aH , σ2〉,
there exists a transition 〈σ1(T,G), aH , σ2(T,G)〉 in transition diagram of Dc(T,G), with σ1(T,G) and σ2(T,G)
being restrictions of σ1 and σ2 (respectively) to the relevant signature Σc(T,G).
Once the relevant coarse-resolution system description has been identified, the zoomed system description can be
constructed as follows.
Definition 2 [Zoomed system description]
For a coarse-resolution transition T and goal G, the fine-resolution system description Df (T,G) with signature
Σf (T,G) is the zoomed fine-resolution system description if:
1. Basic sorts of Σf (T,G) are those of Df that are components of the basic sorts of Dc(T ).
2. Functions of Σf (T,G) are those of Df restricted to the basic sorts of Σf (T,G).
3. Actions of Σf (T,G) are those of Df restricted to the basic sorts of Σf (T,G).
4. Axioms of Df (T,G) are those of Df restricted to the signature Σf (T,G).
Continuing with our example in the RA domain, the object constants of Σf (T,G) include rob1, places {office1, kitchen},
cells {ci : ci ∈ kitchen∪office1}, and book tb1. Domain attributes of Σf (T,G) include loc(rob1, P ), loc∗(rob1, C),
next to(P1, P2), next to∗(C1, C2), with the variables taking values from the set of places and cells in Σf (T,G), and
properly restricted relations for testing and observing the values of fluents etc. In a similar manner, actions of Σf (T,G)
include move∗(rob1, ci), which moves the robot to a particular cell, test(rob1, loc∗(rob1, ci)), which checks whether
rob1 is in a particular cell location, and observed(rob1, loc(tb1, cj)), which represents the observation of tb1 in a par-
ticular cell. Also, restricting axioms of Df to the signature Σf (T,G) removes causal laws for pickup and putdown,
and irrelevant state constraints and executability conditions; the variables in the remaining axioms are restricted to
object constants in Σf (T,G). It can be shown that for any given transition 〈σ1(T,G), aH , σ2(T,G)〉 in the coarse-
resolution transition diagram of Dc(T,G), there exists a path between a refinement of σ1(T,G) and a refinement of
σ2(T,G). This result can be established by following steps similar to those in the proof provided in prior work [26].
The key differences are the revised definitions of relevance and zooming, as provided above, which will require suit-
able revisions in the proof.
Once the relevant fine-resolution description has been identified, prior work achieved fine-resolution implemen-
tations of any desired coarse resolution transition T by (a) mapping Df (T ) and estimated probabilities of state tran-
sitions to a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP); and (b) using an approximate solver to solve
each such POMDP and obtain a policy that maps belief states to actions. Although the POMDP that is constructed
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and solved only focuses on the relevant part of the fine-resolution description, this approach can become computa-
tionally expensive in complex domains. Instead, to implement transition T in our architecture, ASP-based reasoning
with Π(Df (T,G),Hf ) is used to compute a sequence of concrete (i.e., fine-resolution) actions, with the goal being
a fine-resolution counterpart of the resultant state of the coarse-resolution transition T . In what follows, we use “re-
finement and zooming” to refer to the use of both refinement and zooming as described above. The execution of each
fine-resolution concrete action is then based on existing implementations of algorithms for common robotics tasks
such as navigation, mapping, object recognition, localization, and grasping—see Section 4 for more details. These
algorithms provide probabilistic measures of certainty about their decisions, e.g., about the presence or absence of
target objects in an image of the scene. When the robot makes decisions at the fine resolution, the high-probability
outcomes of each concrete action’s execution get elevated to statements associated with complete certainty in Hf
and used for subsequent reasoning; this approach may result in incorrect commitments but the non-monotonic logical
reasoning capability helps the robot identify and recover from such errors. The coarse-resolution outcomes of such
fine-resolution reasoning are added to the coarse-resolutionHc for subsequent reasoning using AT I. The CR-Prolog
programs for fine-resolution reasoning in the RA domain (i.e., with the refined and zoomed system description), and
the program for the overall control loop of the architecture, are available in our online repository [25].
The following are the key differences that distinguish fine-resolution reasoning in our architecture from that in
prior work on the refinement-based architecture [26]:
1. Prior work did not maintain a history and perform logical reasoning at the fine-resolution; as stated earlier,
a POMDP-based approach was used, which becomes computationally expensive in complex domains. Also,
prior work assumed limited dynamic changes in the domain during planning and execution. These limitations
are relaxed in the architecture described in this paper. Fine-resolution reasoning builds a consistent model of
history, and considers the relevant fine-resolution observations to compute and add appropriate statements to the
coarse-resolution history. Furthermore, the tight coupling between the system descriptions and the separation
of concerns, with AT I only included in the coarse resolution, helps establish the desirable properties of prior
work, e.g., about the existence of paths in the fine-resolution transition diagram for any given transition in the
coarse-resolution diagram.
2. Zooming is a key requirement for the desired reasoning capabilities and for computational efficiency. Prior
work on zooming automatically extracted the part of the fine-resolution system description relevant to the im-
plementation of any given transition at the coarse resolution. The architecture described in this paper, on the
other hand, automatically identifies and reasons about the part of the fine-resolution system description relevant
to the coarse-resolution transition and the goal under consideration. As a result, reasoning and plan execution
are reliable and efficient in the presence of dynamic (and unexpected) changes in the domain.
3. Prior work used a POMDP to reason probabilistically over the zoomed fine-resolution system descriptionDf (T )
for any coarse-resolution transition T . This is a computationally expensive process, especially when domain
changes prevent reuse of POMDP policies [26]. In this paper, CR-Prolog is used to compute a plan of concrete
actions from Df (T,G). Each concrete action is then executed using algorithms that incorporate probabilistic
models of uncertainty, significantly reducing the computational cost of fine-resolution reasoning and execution.
In addition, the algorithms for the individual concrete actions can be implemented, revised, and replaced without
requiring any further changes in the other components of the architecture.
As we show below, these differences help improve the reliability and computational efficiency of reasoning.
4 Experimental Setup and Results
This section reports the results of experimentally evaluating the capabilities of our architecture in different scenarios.
We evaluated the following hypotheses:
• H1: using AT I improves the computational efficiency in comparison with not using it, especially in scenarios
with unexpected success.
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• H2: usingAT I improves the accuracy in comparison with not using it, especially in scenarios with unexpected
goal-relevant observations.
• H3: the architecture that combines AT I with refinement and zooming supports reliable and efficient operation
in complex (robot) domains.
We report results of evaluating these hypotheses experimentally: (a) in a simulated domain based on Example 1; (b)
on a Baxter robot manipulating objects on a tabletop; and (c) on a Turtlebot finding and moving objects to particular
places in an indoor domain. We also provide some execution traces as illustrative examples of the working of the
architecture. To evaluate the ability to scale to more complex domains, we defined variants of the RA domain at eight
different complexity levels. The key components of each complexity level are as follows:
• L1: one object with one fine-resolution part, i.e., no new parts considered after refinement; two rooms with two
cells in each room.
• L2: two objects, each with two refined parts; three rooms with two cells in each room.
• L3: three objects, each with three fine-resolution parts (e.g., base and handle of cup); four rooms with four cells
in each room.
• L4: four objects, each with four refined parts; five rooms with five cells in each room.
• L5: eight objects, each with two refined parts; five rooms with nine cells in each room.
• L6: eight objects, each with two fine-resolution parts, and four objects, each with one fine-resolution part; five
rooms with twelve cells in each room.
• L7: eight objects, each with two fine-resolution parts, and four objects, each with one fine-resolution part; five
rooms with sixteen cells in each room.
• L8: sixteen objects, each with two fine-resolution parts, and eight objects, each with one fine-resolution part;
five rooms with sixteen cells in each room.
where the number of objects, number of object parts, number of rooms, and the number of cells in each room, typically
increase between consecutive complexity levels. There are some exceptions, e.g., between L5 − L6 and L6 − L7,
introduced to isolate and study the effects of a change in the value of one of these parameters.
In each experimental trial, the robot’s goal was to find and move one or more objects to particular locations. As a
baseline for comparison for hypotheses H1 and H2, we used an ASP-based reasoner that does not includeAT I—we
refer to this as the “traditional planning” (T P) approach. The term “traditional” implies that the planner only monitors
the effects of the action being executed; it does not identify and monitor observations related to the current transition
and the goal. We do not use T I as the baseline for comparison because it includes components that make it much
more computationally expensive than AT I. Also, T I does not support reasoning with incomplete knowledge, non-
determinism, and partial observability, capabilities that are often needed in robotics domains—see Section 3.2 for a
related discussion. In the T P approach, the robot uses ASP to reason with incomplete domain knowledge, and only
monitors the outcome(s) of the action currently being executed. Recall thatAT I is introduced in the coarse resolution;
to thoroughly examine the effect of this theory, we first compare AT I with T P in the coarse resolution, i.e., without
any refinement, zooming, or fine-resolution reasoning. We then separately examine the effect of refinement, zooming,
and probabilistic models of the uncertainty in sensing and actuation, in the context of evaluating hypothesis H3. We
do so by combining refinement and zooming with AT I; the baseline for comparison was a system that did not use
zooming as part of fine-resolution reasoning—we refer to this as the “non-zooming” approach that still includesAT I
(at the coarse resolution) and reasoning with the refined description. We also combine AT I with refinement and
zooming to run experiments on robots. Although we do not do so in this paper, our architecture’s components for
fine-resolution reasoning can also be combined with T P (if needed).
As stated in Section 3.3, we use existing implementations of suitable algorithms for executing the concrete actions,
e.g., for navigation, object recognition, obstacle avoidance, and manipulation. These algorithms internally model and
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estimate the uncertainty in sensing and actuation probabilistically. Some of these algorithms operate continuously
(e.g., for obstacle avoidance), while others (e.g., object recognition) are selected and used as needed. When we run
experiments in simulation (see Section 4.2 below), we use statistics obtained from executing the concrete actions on
robots to simulate the probabilistic models of uncertainty, e.g., the robot moves to the desired grid cell in 85% of the
trial and recognizes an object correctly in 90% of the trials. When we run experiments on robots (see Section 4.3
below), we use existing implementations of algorithms developed by us and other researchers based on the Robot
Operating System (ROS). For instance, whenever we use our architecture in a domain where the robot can move, we
use the particle filter-based algorithm in ROS for simultaneous localization and mapping [8]. This algorithm enables
the robot to periodically, simultaneously, and probabilistically track multiple hypotheses, each of which represent a
pose sequence and a map of the domain. For visual object recognition, we use an algorithm developed by others in our
research group. This algorithm is used when needed by executing a suitable knowledge-producing (e.g., test) action,
and is based on learned models that characterize each object using color, shape, and local gradient features [18]. We
also use an existing implementation in ROS for local obstacle avoidance. These algorithms associate probabilities with
outcomes, e.g., a probabilistic measure of certainty is computed and provided with the robot’s estimate of its pose, or
its estimate of the class label assigned to domain objects observed in camera images.
We used one or more of the following performance measures to evaluate the hypotheses: (i) total (planning and ex-
ecution) time; (ii) number of plans computed; (iii) planning time; (iv) execution time; (v) number of actions executed;
and (vi) accuracy. Note a plan is considered to be correct if it is minimal and results (on execution) in the achievement
of the goal. We begin with execution traces demonstrating the working of the architecture.
4.1 Execution traces
The following execution traces illustrate the differences in the decisions made by a robot using AT I in comparison
with a robot using T P , focusing primarily on coarse-resolution reasoning. These traces correspond to scenarios
drawn from the RA domain; we focus on scenarios in which the robot has to respond to unexpected observed effects
(successes and failures) caused by exogenous actions.
Execution Example 1 [Example of Scenario-2]
Assume that robot rob1 is in the kitchen initially, holding book1 in its hand, and believes that book2 is in office2 and
the library is unlocked.
• The goal is to have book1 and book2 in the library. The computed plan is the same for AT I and T P , and
consists of actions:
move(rob1, library), putdown(rob1, book1),
move(rob1, kitchen), move(rob1, office2),
pickup(rob1, book2), move(rob1, kitchen)
move(rob1, library), putdown(rob1, book2)
• Assume that as the robot is putting book1 down in the library, book2 has been moved (e.g., by a human or other
external agent) to the library.
• With AT I, the robot observes book2 in the library, reasons and explains the observation as the result of an
exogenous action, realizes the goal has been achieved and stops further planning and execution.
• With T P , the robot does not observe or does not use the information encoded in the observation of book2. It will
thus waste time executing subsequent steps of the plan until it is unable to find or pickup book2 in the library.
It will then replan (potentially including prior observation of book2) and eventually achieve the desired goal. It
may also compute and pursue plans assuming book2 is in different places, and take more time to achieve the
goal.
Execution Example 2 [Example of Scenario-5]
Assume that robot rob1 is in the kitchen initially, holding book1 in its hand, and believes that book2 is in kitchen and
the library is unlocked.
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• The goal is to have book1 and book2 in the library. The computed plan is the same for AT I and T P , and
consists of the actions:
move(rob1, library), putdown(rob1, book1),
move(rob1, kitchen), pickup(rob1, book2),
move(rob1, library), putdown(rob1, book2)
• Assume the robot is in the act of putting book2 in the library, after having already put down book1 in the
library earlier. However, book1 is unexpectedly moved from the library (e.g., to the kitchen, unknown to the
robot) while the robot is moving book2.
• With AT I, the robot observes book1 in not in the library, realizes the goal has not been achieved although the
computed plan has been completed, computes a new plan, and executes this plan until it finds book1 and moves
it to the library.
• With T P , the robot puts book2 in the library and stops execution because it believes it has achieved the desired
goal. In other words, it does not realize that the goal has not been achieved.
4.2 Experimental Results in Simulation
We evaluated hypotheses H1 and H2 extensively in a simulated world that mimics Example 1, with four places and
different objects. Please note the following:
• As stated earlier, we first comparedAT I with T P in the context of the coarse-resolution domain representation,
i.e., these trials did not include refinement, zooming or fine-resolution reasoning. We also temporarily abstracted
away uncertainty in perception and actuation.
• We conducted paired trials and compared the results obtained using T P with those obtained usingAT I for the
same initial conditions and for the same dynamic domain changes (when appropriate), e.g., a book is moved
unknown to the robot and the robot obtains an unexpected observation.
• When we included fine-resolution reasoning in simulation, we assumed a fixed execution time for each concrete
action to measure execution time, e.g., 15 units for moving from a room to the neighboring room, 5 units to pick
up an object or put it down; and 5 units to open a door.
• Ground truth (e.g., minimal plan) was provided by a separate component that reasons with complete domain
knowledge.
Table 1 summarizes the results of ≈ 800 paired trials in each of the five scenarios described in Section 3.2. Also, all
claims made below were tested for statistical significance. The initial conditions, e.g., starting location of the robot
and objects’ locations, and the goal, were set randomly in each paired trial. However, before choosing a particular
instance of a scenario defined by a particular initial condition, the simulator does use ground truth knowledge (not
available to the robot) to verify that the chosen goal is reachable from the chosen initial conditions. Also, in suitable
scenarios, a randomly-chosen, valid (unexpected) domain change is introduced in each paired trial. Given the signifi-
cant differences that may exist between two paired trials, averaging the measured time or plan length across different
trials does not provide any useful information about the performance of the two approaches being compared. In each
paired trial, the value of each performance measure (except accuracy) obtained with T P is thus expressed as a fraction
of the value of the same performance measure obtained with AT I; each value reported in Table 1 is the average of
these computed ratios. We highlight some key findings below.
Scenario-1 represents a standard planning task with no unexpected domain changes. In this scenario, both T P and
AT I provide the same accuracy (100%) and compute essentially the same plan, but computing an activity comprising
intentional actions and repeatedly checking the validity of this activity takes longer. This explains the reported average
values of 0.45 and 0.81 for planning time and total time (for T P) in Table 1 above.
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Scenarios Average Ratios AccuracyTot. Time # Plans Plan. Time Exec. Time # Actions T P AT I
1 0.81 1.00 0.45 1.00 1.00 100% 100%
2 3.06 2.63 1.08 5.10 3.61 100% 100%
3 0.81 0.92 0.34 1.07 1.12 72% 100%
4 1.00 1.09 0.40 1.32 1.26 73% 100%
5 0.18 0.35 0.09 0.21 0.28 0% 100%
All 1.00 1.08 0.41 1.39 1.30 74% 100%
3 - no failures 1.00 1.11 0.42 1.32 1.39 100% 100%
4 - no failures 1.22 1.31 0.49 1.61 1.53 100% 100%
All - no failures 1.23 1.30 0.5 1.72 1.60 100% 100%
Table 1: Experimental results comparing AT I with T P in different scenarios. Values of all performance measures
(except accuracy) for T P are expressed as a fraction of the values of the same measures for AT I. AT I improves
accuracy and computational efficiency, especially in dynamic domains.
In Scenario-2 (unexpected success), both T P and AT I achieve 100% accuracy. Here, AT I stops reasoning and
execution once it realizes the desired goal has been achieved unexpectedly. However, T P does not realize this because
it does not consider observations not directly related to the action being executed; it keeps trying to find the objects
of interest in different places. This explains why T P has a higher planning time and execution time, computes more
plans, and executes more actions (i.e., plan steps) than AT I.
Scenarios 3-5 correspond to different kinds of unexpected failures. In each trial for these scenarios, AT I leads
to a successful achievement of the goal, whereas there are many instances in which T P is unable to recover from the
unexpected observations and achieve the goal. For instance, if the goal is to move two books to the library, and one of
the books is moved to an unexpected location when it is no longer part of an un-executed action in the robot’s plan, the
robot may not reason about this unexpected occurrence and the desired goal may not be achieved. This phenomenon
is especially pronounced in Scenario-5 that represents an extreme case in which the robot using T P is never able
to achieve the assigned goal because it never realizes that it has failed to achieve the goal. Notice that in the trials
corresponding to all three scenarios, AT I takes more time than T P to plan and execute the plans for any given goal,
but this increase in time is justified given the high accuracy and the desired behavior that the robot is able to achieve
in these scenarios using AT I.
The row labeled “All” in Table 1 shows the average of the results obtained in the different scenarios. The subse-
quent three rows in Table 1 summarize results after removing from consideration trials in which T P fails to achieve
the assigned goal. We then notice that AT I is at least as fast as T P and is often faster, i.e., it takes less time (overall)
to plan and execute actions to achieve the desired goal. In summary, T P may result in faster planning in well-defined
domains with little or no dynamic changes, but it results in lower accuracy and higher execution time than AT I in
dynamic domains, especially in the presence of unexpected successes and failures that are common in dynamic do-
mains. The results in Table 1 provide evidence in support of hypotheses H1 and H2. The subsequent analysis of the
fine-resolution components of our architecture was thus performed by combining them with AT I and not with T P .
Next, to evaluate hypothesis H3, we ran experiments in the eight complexity levels listed in Section 4, with
and without including zooming. All trials included AT I for coarse-resolution reasoning with the adapted theory
of intentions, and refined domain representation for fine-resolution reasoning. Recall that the robot cannot actually
execute the coarse-resolution actions. As before, the goal in each experimental trial was to find and move a target object
to a target location. Similar to the experiments used to evaluate H1 and H2, the values of performance measures
without zooming are, wherever appropriate, expressed a fraction of the values with zooming. Table 2 and Table 3
summarize the corresponding results, and we make the following observations:
• When AT I was used with zooming, all trials in all complexity levels terminated successfully, i.e., the assigned
goal was always achieved—see Table 2. Without zooming, the goal was achieved in all trials in complexity
levels L1 and L2, in only 65% of the trials in complexity level L3, and in none of the trials in complexity levels
L4−L8. The observed failures in complexity levels L3−L8 were due to the existence of too many options (i.e.,
paths in the transition diagram) to consider during fine-resolution reasoning in the absence of zooming. In such
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Complexity level L1 L2 L3
Reasoning time (total) Zoom 1.00 (6.24± 1.56) 1.00 (8.82± 2.95) 1.00 (11.59± 3.88)
No zoom 1.01 (6.28± 1.57) 1.20 (10.74± 4.14) 20.07 (225.49± 177.64)
Reasoning time (fine) Zoom 1.00 (1.57± 0.51) 1.00 (2.53± 0.92) 1.00 (4.19± 1.48)
No-zoom 1.02 (1.61± 0.54) 1.71 (4.46± 2.29) 55.23 (218.1± 176.97)
Reasoning time (coarse) Zoom 1.00 (4.67± 1.05) 1.00 (6.29± 2.06) 1.00 (7.4± 2.57)
No zoom 1.00 (4.67± 1.03) 1.00 (6.28± 2.06) 1.00 (7.39± 2.58)
Time per refined plan Zoom 1.00 (0.37± 0.02) 1.00 (0.41± 0.02) 1.00 (0.56± 0.05)
No zoom 1.03 (0.39± 0.01) 2.26 (0.93± 0.32) 83.49 (45.98± 43.05)
Completed trials Zoom 100% 100% 100%
No zoom 100% 100% 65%
Table 2: Performance with and without zooming at complexity levels L1 − L3. Values of reasoning times without
zooming are expressed as a fraction of the values with zooming. We only compute the ratio of reasoning times in trials
that resulted in successful achievement of the assigned goal; this considers all the trials for complexity levels L1−L2,
but only 65% of the trials under L3.
cases, fine-resolution planning terminated unexpectedly (i.e., before the goal was achieved) in the absence of
zooming. Thus, Tables 2 and 3 do not consider paired trials at or above complexity level L4; at these complexity
levels, we only report results of trials that included zooming in fine-resolution reasoning.
• The coarse-resolution reasoning time, i.e., the time for coarse-resolution planning and diagnostics, increases
gradually (as expected) with the increase in the complexity level. In general, the time taken for coarse-resolution
reasoning is much smaller in comparison with the fine-resolution reasoning time in complex domains The fine-
resolution reasoning time, i.e. the time for planning at the fine resolution, and for inferring coarse-resolution
observations based on fine-resolution outcomes, also increases with the increase in the complexity level. With
zooming included in the fine-resolution reasoning, this increase is reasoning time scales well with the increase
in the complexity level. However, in the absence of zooming, the increase in reasoning time is much more
pronounced, e.g., fine-resolution reasoning at complexity level L3 without zooming takes (on average) 55 times
as much time as when zooming is used.
• Note that reasoning can imply multiple instances of planning and diagnostics for a particular goal. When
zooming is used, the average time spent computing each refined plan scales well with the increase in the level
of complexity. When zooming is not included in the fine-resolution reasoning, the average time spent in each
refined plan increases dramatically, e.g., even at complexity level L3, each refined plan without zooming takes
(on average) 85 times as much time as with zooming.
• The results with complexity levels L7 and L8 present an interesting comparison, and further indicate the benefits
of zooming. Complexity level L8 has the same number of rooms and cells in each room as L7, but it has twice
as many objects as L7. This increase would typically have caused a significant increase in the reasoning time,
especially when we consider the parts of the different objects in the fine-resolution. However, zooming enables
the robot to limit its attention to only the objects and object parts relevant to any given task; we only observe a
small increase in the coarse-resolution reasoning time, with hardly any change in the fine-resolution reasoning
time.
Overall, Tables 2 and 3 indicate that zooming supports scalable fine-resolution reasoning with the increase in com-
plexity. When used in conjunction with theAT I at the coarse resolution, we obtain reliable and efficient performance
in dynamic domains. These results thus support hypothesis H3.
4.3 Experimental Results on Physical Robots
We also ran experimental trials with the combined architecture, i.e., AT I with refinement and zooming, on two
different robot platforms. These trials represented instances of the different scenarios (in Section 3.2) in domains that
are variants of the RA domain in Example 1.
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Complexity level L4 L5 L6 L7 L8
Reasoning time (total) 18.63± 5.49 22.73± 7.46 29.8± 10.55 41.93± 17.26 42.99± 18.04
Reasoning time (fine) 8.89± 2.99 10.78± 4.08 17.77± 7.55 30.07± 15.48 29.36± 15.76
Reasoning time (coarse) 9.74± 3.26 11.95± 4.17 12.03± 4.33 11.86± 4.12 13.63± 5.07
Time per refined plan 0.95± 0.26 0.98± 0.22 1.64± 0.68 2.3± 1.02 2.3± 1.09
Table 3: Reasoning time for trials using zooming at complexity levels L4 − L8; trials without zooming were unable
to terminate at these complexity levels. All trials using zooming were able to draw inferences and generate plans that
achieved the assigned goal at all complexity levels. The increase in reasoning time with the increase in complexity
levels is reasonable and demonstrates the scalability of our approach that combinesAT I with refinement and zooming.
First, consider the experiments with the Baxter robot manipulating objects on a tabletop as shown in Figure 1. This
domain is characterized by the following:
• The goal is to move particular objects between different “zones” (instead of places), or between particular cell
locations within the zones, on a tabletop.
• After refinement, each zone is magnified to obtain grid cells. Also, each object is magnified into parts such as
base and top after refinement.
• Objects are characterized by the attributes color and size.
• The robot does not have a mobile base but it uses its arm to move objects between cells or zones.
Next, consider the experiments with the Turtlebot robot operating in an indoor domain as shown in Figure 1. This
domain is characterized by the following details:
• The goal is to find and move particular objects between places in an indoor domain.
• The robot does not have a manipulator arm. It solicits help from a human to pickup the desired object when it
has reached the location of the target object, and to put the object down when it has reached the location where
it has to move the object.
• Objects are characterized by the attributes color and type.
• After refinement, each place or zone was magnified to obtain grid cells. Also, each object is magnified into parts
such as base and handle after refinement.
Although the two domains differ significantly, e.g., in terms of the domain attributes, actions and complexity, no change
is required in the architecture or the underlying methodology. Other than providing the domain-specific information,
no human supervision is necessary; most of the other steps are automated. Similar to the experiments in simulation,
we used accuracy (of task completion) and time (for planning and execution) as the performance measures, expressing
the values of relevant measures (e.g., planning time) for the baseline implementation as a fraction of the values with
our architecture. In ≈ 50 experimental trials in each domain, the robot using the combined architecture is able to
successfully achieve the assigned goal. The performance is similar to that observed in the simulation trials. For
instance, if we do not include AT I, i.e., use T P with refinement and zooming, the accuracy with which the goal is
achieved reduces from 100% to ≈ 60%, and it takes ≈ 2 − 3 times as much time to achieve the goal, especially in
the presence of unexpected success or failure. In other scenarios, the performance with AT I is at least as good as
that with T P . Also, if we do not include zooming, the robot takes significantly longer to plan and execute concrete
actions. In fact, as the domain becomes more complex, i.e., with an increase in the number of domain objects and
the length of the plan required to achieve the desired goal, planning starts becoming computationally expensive and
(often) computationally unfeasible without zooming. These results support the three hypotheses listed in Section 4.
Videos of the trials on the Baxter robot and Turtlebot corresponding to different scenarios can be viewed on-
line [29]. For instance, in one trial involving the Turtlebot, the goal is to have both a cup and a bottle in the library,
and these objects and the robot are initially in office2. The computed plan has the robot pick up the bottle, move to
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the kitchen, move to the library, put the bottle down, move back to the kitchen and then to office2, pick up the
cup, move to the library through the kitchen, and put the cup down. When the Turtlebot is moving to the library
holding the bottle, someone moves the cup to the library. With AT I, the robot uses the observation of the cup (as
it is putting the bottle down in the library), to infer that the goal has been achieved and to terminate plan execution
early. Without AT I, i.e., with T P , the robot continued with its initial plan and realized that there was a problem
(unexpected observation of the cup in the library) only when it went back to office2 and did not find the cup there.
Similarly, in one trial with the Baxter, the goal is to have blue blocks and green blocks in zone Y (yellow zone
on the right side of the screen) and these blocks are initially in zone R (red zone on the left side of the screen). The
computed plan has the Baxter move its arm to zone R, pick up a block, move to zone G (green zone in the center) then
to zone Y to put the block down, and repeat this process until it has moved all the blue blocks and green blocks. When
the Baxter has moved one block and is moving back to pick up the second block from zone R, an exogenous action
puts the first block in zone G. With AT I, as the Baxter is moving over zone G on the way to zone R, it observes the
block (it had previously put in zone Y), performs diagnostics and realizes his current activity will not achieve the goal.
It then stops executing its current activity, computes a new activity of intentional actions, and succeeds in moving both
blocks to zone Y. With T P , the robot is not able to use the observation of the first block in zone G, continues with the
initial plan and never realizes that the goal has not been achieved.
5 Discussion and Future Work
In this paper we presented a general architecture that represents and reasons with intentional actions. The architecture
represents and reasons with domain knowledge and beliefs encoded as tightly-coupled transition diagrams at two dif-
ferent resolutions, with the fine-resolution description defined as a refinement of the coarse-resolution description. For
any given goal, non-monotonic logical reasoning with the coarse-resolution domain representation containing com-
monsense domain knowledge is used to provide a plan of intentional abstract actions. The coarse-resolution transition
corresponding to each such abstract intentional action is implemented as a sequence of concrete actions by auto-
matically identifying and reasoning with the part of the fine-resolution representation relevant to the coarse-resolution
transition and the coarse-resolution goal. The execution of each concrete action uses probabilistic models of the uncer-
tainty in sensing and actuation, and any associated outcomes are added to the coarse-resolution history. Experimental
results in simulation and on different robot platforms, as summarized above, indicate that this architecture improves
the accuracy and computational efficiency of decision making in comparison with an architecture that does not reason
with intentional actions. It also significantly improves the computational efficiency of decision making in comparison
with an architecture that does not support zooming in the fine resolution.
This architecture opens up multiple directions for future research that build on the capabilities of the current
architecture. First, although the current architecture builds on key results of the coupling between the transition
diagrams, it will be interesting to formally establish the relationship between the different transition diagrams in this
architecture, along the lines of the analysis provided in [26]. This will enable any designer using our architecture for
a particular robotics domain to establish correctness of the algorithms and build trust in the resultant behavior of the
robot. Second, the results reported in this paper are based on experimental trials in variants of a particular (RA) domain.
However, the underlying capability of modeling and reasoning about intentional actions is relevant to other problems
and applications characterized by dynamic changes. For instance, other work within our research group has combined
the reasoning capabilities of our architecture with inductive learning of domain constraints to guide the construction
of deep networks that have been used for estimating the occlusion and stability of object structures [19] and for
answering explanatory questions about images [21, 22]; other research groups have explored the combination of ASP-
based knowledge representation with low-level perceptual processing for explaining spatial relations in videos [28].
Future research can adapt our architecture to such problems in more complex domains to demonstrate the scalability
and wider applicability of our architecture. Third, the relational representation and reasoning capabilities supported by
our architecture can be used to provide explanations of the decisions made, the underlying beliefs, and the experiences
that informed these beliefs. Currently, our architecture only reasons with representations at two different resolutions,
but proof of concept work indicates that it is possible to introduce a theory of explanations and expand the notion
of refinement to interactively provide explanations at different levels of abstraction [27]. Fourth, the architecture has
only considered a single robot representing and reasoning with intentional actions. There is considerable research on
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a team of robots working with humans, including approaches based on logic programming approaches [11]. Future
work can extend our architecture to a team of robots collaborating with humans in dynamic application domains such
as disaster rescue, surveillance, and healthcare. The long-term goal is to enable a team of robots collaborating with
humans in complex domains to represent and reason reliably and efficiently with different descriptions of incomplete
domain knowledge and uncertainty.
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